In the February 15, 2003 issue of CRYPTO-GRAM, Bruce Schneier of Counterpane provides a persuasive argument for why security properties of different systems, including IT and locks, are better of being open to public scrutiny instead of being kept secret.
02/17/2003 00:09:37
In the February 15, 2003 issue of CRYPTO-GRAM, Bruce Schneier of Counterpane provides a persuasive argument for why security properties of different systems, including IT and locks, are better of being open to public scrutiny instead of being kept secret. The full disclosure vs. bug secrecy debate is a lot larger than computer security. In January, security researcher Matt Blaze published a paper describing a new attack against door locks. The specific locks are "master key systems," the sorts that allow each person to have a key to his own office and the janitor to have a single key that opens every office. The specific attack is one where a person with an individual office key can make himself a master key. The specifics are interesting, and I invite you to read the paper. It turns out that the ways we've learned to conceptualize security and attacks in the computer world are directly applicable to other areas of security — like door locks. But the most interesting part of this entire story is that the locksmith community went ballistic after learning about what Blaze did.
The technique was known in the locksmithing community and in the criminal community for over a century, but was never discussed in public and remained folklore. Customers who bought these master key systems for over a century were completely oblivious to the security risks. Locksmiths liked it that way, believing that the security of a system was increased by keeping these sorts of vulnerabilities from the general population. The bug secrecy position is a lot easier to explain to a layman. If there's a vulnerability in a system, it's better not to make that vulnerability public. The bad guys will learn about it and use it, the argument goes. Last month's SQL Slammer is a case in point. If the hacker who wrote the worm hadn't had access to the public information about the SQL vulnerability, maybe he wouldn't have written the worm. The problem, according to this position, is more the information about the vulnerability and less the vulnerability itself. This position ignores the fact that public scrutiny is the only reliable way to improve security. There are several master key designs that are immune to the 100-year-old attack that Blaze rediscovered. They're not common in the marketplace primarily because customers don't understand the risks, and because locksmiths continue to knowingly sell a flawed security system rather than admit and then fix the problem. This is no different from the computer world. Before software vulnerabilities were routinely published, vendors would not bother spending the time and money to fix vulnerabilities, believing in the security of secrecy. And since customers didn't know any better, they bought these systems believing them to be secure. If we return to a world of bug secrecy in computers, we'll have the equivalent of 100-year-old vulnerabilities known by a few in the security community and by the hacker underground. That's the other fallacy with the locksmiths' argument. Techniques like this are passed down as folklore in the criminal community as well as in the locksmithing community. In 1994, a thief made his own master key to a series of safe-deposit boxes and stole $1.5 million in jewels. The same thing happens in the computer world. By the time a software vulnerability is announced in the press and patched, it's already folklore in the hacker underground. Attackers don't abide by secrecy agreements. What we're seeing is a culture clash; it's happening in many areas of security. Attorney General Ashcroft is working to keep details of many antiterrorism countermeasures secret so as not to educate the terrorists. But at the same time, the people — to whom he is ultimately accountable — would not be allowed to evaluate the countermeasures, or comment on their efficacy. Security couldn't improve because there'd be no public debate or public education. Whatever attacks and defenses people learn would become folklore, never spoken about in the open but whispered from security engineer to security engineer and from terrorist to terrorist. And maybe in 100 years someone will publish an attack that some security engineers knew about, that terrorists and criminals had been exploiting for much of that time, but that the general public had been blissfully unaware of. Secrecy prevents people from assessing their own risk. For example, in the master key case, even if there weren't more secure designs available, many customers might have decided not to use master keying if they knew how easy it was for an attacker to make his own master key.
I'd rather have as much information as I can to make an informed decision about security. I'd rather have the information I need to pressure vendors to improve security. I don't want to live in a world where locksmiths can sell me a master key system that they know doesn't work or where the government can implement security measures without accountability.